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ABSTRACT 
This theoretical study explores therapeutic impasse through the 
dual lens of relational theory and infant research. Particular 
attention is paid to the role that enactment, rupture and repair, and 
non-verbal communication play in impasse dynamics. Defined broadly--as 
any time a therapist and patient feel stuck--impasse is conceptualized 
as an expectable, even inevitable, component of the treatment 
relationship. This paper further posits that small moments of impasse 
hold potential for growth. Finally, the implications for navigating 
impasse are considered through a clinical vignette. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
From the complications of loving you 
I think there is no end or return. 
No answer, no coming out of it. 
 
Which is the only way to love, isn't it? 
This isn't a playground, this is 
earth, our heaven, for a while. 
 
Therefore I have given precedence 
to all my sudden, sullen, dark moods 
that hold you in the center of my world. 
 
And I say to my body: grow thinner still. 
And I say to my fingers, type me a pretty song. 
And I say to my heart: rave on. 
--A Pretty Song, Mary Oliver 
  
 The dictionary defines impasse as a road or passage having no 
exit; a situation that is so difficult that no progress can be made; a 
deadlock (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000). For the most part, 
psychoanalytic theory has hewed closely to this definition, equating 
impasse with failed treatment. Historically, discussions of impasse 
were either shied away from altogether in the literature, or shrouded 
in words such as avoidance (Balint, 1952), last resort (Buxbaum, 1954), 
risk (Loewenstein, 1954), stubbornness (Giovacchini, 1961), 
hopelessness (Ulanov, 1973), depletion, despair (Gorney, 1979), and 
paralysis (Maldonado, 1984).  
 This study is concerned with broadening the definition and 
understanding of therapeutic impasse. But it also endeavors to 
circumscribe the belief that impasse is inherently damaging to a 
treatment. By opening up the definition of clinical impasse to include 
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any time a patient and therapist feel stuck, impasse comes to be 
conceptualized as expectable, inevitable even. The essential question 
is no longer how do we avoid impasse, but rather, how do we find 
ourselves in such spots? What do they mean for treatment? And, perhaps 
most importantly, how do we find our way through?  
 Impasse is a phenomenon encountered by all clinicians at all 
levels of experience. Yet the literature most frequently addresses 
protracted and wayward stalemates, a variety of impasse few beginning 
clinicians will face. To that end, in addition to charting a brief 
history of the literature on impasse in Chapter II, this theoretical 
study attends to more subtle impasse experiences as well. In doing so 
it attempts to address a significant gap in the literature, of 
particular relevance to beginning clinicians.  
 Toward developing an understanding of impasse, I first turn to 
relational theory. Chapter III attempts to illuminate impasse through 
enactment, a phenomenon that some relational analysts consider 
synonymous with impasse. Chapter IV presents an understanding of 
impasse derived from infancy research, pulling particularly from models 
of rupture-repair and nonverbal communication. Just as a relational 
approach views enactment as inevitable and necessary, such is the case 
with rupture and repair through an infancy lens. Finally, the two 
frameworks are synthesized in Chapter V, through the Case of Bee, a 
vignette drawn from my own first-year clinical placement.  
 I suggest that when viewed together, these two theoretical 
sensibilities open a therapist’s awareness to all of what may be 
happening between clinician and patient during moments of impasse--from 
the interpersonal and intrapsychic to the relational and behavioral, 
explicit and implicit, spoken and non-verbal. In conjunction, 
relational theory and infancy research offer a frame from which to work 
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with impasse. Through these two theories, clinicians are able to 
glimpse the transformation and growth that are the counterpoint to even 
small moments of impasse. 
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CHAPTER II 
ON THE PHENOMENON OF IMPASSE 
 
 
Loss, mourning, the longing for memory, the desire to enter into the 
world around you and having no idea how to do it, the fear of observing 
too coldly or too distractedly or too raggedly, the rage of cowardice, 
the insight that is always arriving late, as defiant hindsight…. 
[These] are the stopping places along the way.  
--Ruth Behar, The Vulnerable Observer 
 
The patient is wondering why the analyst doesn’t get it when the 
patient has tried to show her a hundred times. The analyst feels 
defeated by the patient’s refusal of her understanding, and the patient 
is convinced the analyst doesn’t understand or can’t help.  
--Jessica Benjamin, Recognition and Destruction: An Outline of 
 Intersubjectivity 
 
 Early in her collection of essays, The Vulnerable Observer, 
anthropologist Ruth Behar (1996) relays the story of a photographer, a 
reporter who stood by helplessly snapping pictures as a young Colombian 
woman drowned in mud. Then suddenly, he reaches out to her.  
 Behar (1996) identifies this tension, between observing and 
intervening, containing and enacting, as “the central dilemma of all 
efforts at witnessing” (p. 2). In essence what Behar describes in that 
moment when the photographer stands frozen, unsure of how to proceed, 
is a snapshot of impasse. It is an experience routinely encountered by 
those professional witnesses who are therapists as well.  
 The work that goes on in the consulting room and the impassable 
moments that take shape there may seem far removed from the life and 
death drama of a Colombian mudslide. Yet the literature often portrays 
impasse as a juncture where the fate of a therapy stands in the 
balance. One writer on the subject portentously suggests, “At moments 
of impasse, both the therapist and the patient are subjected to the 
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ultimate test. What is each of them willing to do to save the therapy?” 
(Darwin, 1999, p. 468). Another clinician, in the aftermath of impasse, 
describes a patient recalling that it “felt like another life and death 
situation in which one of us would have to ‘die’ so that the other 
would live” (Ringstrom, 1998, p. 312). And from the analyst’s 
perspective, a third offers: “I often find myself feeling that I am 
engaged in some kind of life and death battle for my sanity and mental 
integrity” (Davies, 2004, p. 719). The ultimate test, indeed. 
 Yet impasse occurs on a continuum. Certainly there are ruptures 
so deep there seems little hope of recovery (Elkind, 1992; Pizer, 2004) 
as well as intractable deadlocks. Perhaps more common, though, and less 
carefully documented, are the subtle, everyday moments--marked by 
boredom, confusion, stagnation, and missattunement. They are the 
experiences that suggest, rather than feeling as though impasse 
intrudes on therapy, we might be better served in thinking of impasse 
as simply another part of therapy. 
 I first became interested in impasse while trying to make sense 
of an experience with a patient during my first-year clinical 
placement. A group that I was co-leading with another intern slogged 
along over weeks as we endeavored to negotiate and re-negotiate one 
patient’s feelings of safety in relation to another. But the more 
effort we made to accommodate Bee, whose case will be discussed in 
Chapter V, the more deeply mired we seemed to become. It was not one of 
the enduring or “dramatically wrong” (Pizer, 2004, p. 2929) bouts that 
populate the impasse literature. Nonetheless, to a nascent clinician 
trying to navigate her way through, it felt significant.  
 The way in which I came to understand this case drew largely on 
the concepts of enactment, rupture and repair, and nonverbal 
communication--the former drawn from relational theory, the latter 
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concepts as described by infancy studies. Together, they are the 
primary phenomena and theories that will be developed in this thesis, 
toward a conceptualization of impasse. 
 
Toward a New Definition 
 Faltering and missteps have come to be recognized as unavoidable 
parts of the therapeutic process. In defining impasse broadly--as any 
time a therapist and patient feel stuck--I hope to suggest the 
experience of impasse can also be viewed through this lens. It need not 
be dramatized nor shied away from. As with any other aspect of the 
clinical encounter, where “self-correction is our way of life” 
(Benjamin, 2009, p. 443), perhaps we will come to see impasse as just 
one more component of the treatment process, just another part of our 
way of life. 
 Though a therapy may seem to have lost momentum (Harris, 2009) or 
come to a stand still, the very act of surviving and working through 
(Freud, 1914) a therapeutic impasse may ultimately be what moves 
treatment forward. Even small moments of impasse hold the potential for 
growth. Woven together, routine impasse experiences give texture to our 
relationships, both within and outside the consulting room. They are 
deserving of deeper exploration. 
 In what follows, I attempt a brief review of the psychoanalytic 
literature on the historical development of impasse. From there I will 
offer an introduction to the more contemporary relational and infancy-
based understandings that anchor subsequent chapters. This section 
highlights the shift in psychoanalytic theory from thinking of impasse 
as a state of resistance located within the patient to a shared 
experience, one co-constructed and co-negotiated by patient and 
therapist alike. It parallels the field’s broader shift from a “one-
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person psychology” to a relational perspective that accounts for the 
subjectivities of both patient and analyst. This orientation is 
furthered by the dyadic view of mother-infant interactions that has 
come to be the hallmark of contemporary infancy studies.  
 
A History of Impasse 
Freud’s Case: Impasse as Transference 
 The earliest clinical example of impasse dates back to Freud 
(1905) and his turn-of-the-century analysis of Ida Bauer, a young woman 
he called Dora. Ultimately Dora, suffering from what Freud (1905) 
termed “petite hystérie” (p.23), resolved their stalemate. She leaves 
treatment and a somewhat befuddled Freud after three months--instead of 
the yearlong analysis that he had prescribed. Their case is a study in 
what Elkind (1992) might call unresolved impasse leading to a ruptured 
termination.  
 Well before the end of treatment, Freud (1905) conveys a feeling 
associated with the more garden variety of impasse: boredom. He writes 
that alongside her lingering, nervous cough, Dora “kept on repeating 
her complaints against her father with a wearisome monotony” (Freud, 
1905, p.46). Freud uses his feeling of tedium as a way into Dora’s 
latent sense that her impotent father, who had referred her to 
treatment, was engaging in oral sex with his mistress. Yet one can’t 
help but wonder whether perhaps Dora’s complaints were in fact a way of 
expressing dissatisfaction with Freud and her treatment?  
 At the time, Freud (1905) was just beginning to uncover the 
concept and utility of transference, speculating that early in their 
work he might have been for Dora a desirable father figure. In 
“Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” Freud (1905) further 
recognizes that he played a role in the two dreams that Dora brought to 
  8 
analysis. He suggests that his failure to identify this transference 
early enough may have caused their rupture, postulating that had he 
taken more seriously Dora’s clear hint of not returning to treatment--
just as she ran away from her aspiring older suitor--their work 
together might have continued. Freud nonetheless seems naively unaware 
of his own more subjective role and feelings in the development of 
Dora’s analysis and their impasse--specifically the depth of his 
countertransference. Later, Freud comes to understand impasse as a 
transference phenomenon, a resistance on the part of the patient to 
unconscious desires and affects (Darwin, 1999).  
 As with Freud and Dora, clinicians writing on impasse have 
historically focused on the patient, relegating the therapist to the 
background. If described at all, the therapist’s function was treated 
as a signal or vessel for impasse that actually resided within the 
patient’s internal world (Harris, 2009). This emphasis on the 
transference--the notion that the difficulty of impasse lay in the 
patient--remained the model from Freud’s early 20th-century drive theory 
through ego psychology and into the self psychology of the 1980s.  
 Whereas drive theory conceived of impasse in terms of the 
patient’s resistance, ego psychology viewed impasse as the result of 
conflicts between the patient’s id, ego, and superego. Early self 
psychology attributed impasse to the patient’s fragmentation in the 
face of the therapist’s empathic failure. While this final analysis 
shifted the thinking closer to a contemporary relational understanding, 
it remained stubbornly fixed on the patient’s fragmented response, 
rather than the clinician’s part in generating that response (Darwin, 
1999).  
 Summarizing the prevailing understanding of impasse from Freud 
through Kohut, Darwin (1999) writes, 
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The patient brings the therapeutic process to a halt 
because (1) he can't own his own wishes, (2) his ego is not 
strong enough to regulate his id and/or his superego, (3) 
he has unacceptable thoughts and feelings which must be 
disavowed, or (4) his self is not sufficiently cohesive to 
withstand empathic failure (p. 460).   
 
In all these formulations, writes Darwin (1999), “Blame for impasses is 
thus laid at the feet of the patient” (p. 460). Impasse was indeed 
understood as primarily a transference phenomenon. The analyst was 
rarely implicated.  
 
Rowley’s Case: Transference Continued 
 In another example of the prominence of transference, Rowley, a 
British psychoanalyst in the Independent Group writing in the 1950s, 
describes his work with young and unmarried Emily Standish. She enters 
treatment two years after becoming frightened at a dance. Emily 
subsequently finds herself plagued by a general self-consciousness and 
discomfort around people.  
 Rowley (1951) understands their work in terms of “revealing and 
naming of the unknown” (p. 195). Their treatment impasse is marked by 
Emily’s extreme inhibition, which manifests itself as a difficulty 
speaking freely and revealing her dream life to her analyst. Writing 
largely in libidinal and aggressive drive terms, Rowley views Emily’s 
relational pattern with men as one in which she first stimulates and 
then frustrates. In her life outside the consulting room, Emily does 
not let her partner engage in intercourse. In the consulting room, she 
will not give her analyst the material he needs to do his work. The 
parallel process of impasse, both in the therapeutic dyad and in 
Emily’s romantic relationship, is worth noting, if only to remind us of 
the encompassing nature of relational impasse.  
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 Despite what Rowley (1951) perceives as Emily’s “defiant attempt 
to keep control by rendering the analyst powerless, impotent and 
castrated” (p. 190), he reports that they are eventually able to work 
through her efforts at frustrating both analyst and his analysis. In 
this closely recounted case, however, Rowley makes hardly any mention 
of his role in either their therapeutic relationship or the resulting 
impasse. He simply describes the many ways in which Emily has acted 
upon him--whether it is what she has done to him or the reactions she 
has incited in him. 
 Once Emily can speak more freely, Rowley (1951) finds himself 
less stimulated. It is anti-climactic. He apologizes to the reader for 
not instilling the case study with more excitement. Though to his mind 
this can’t be helped--it is, after all, the fault of the patient. Again 
he consigns the phenomenon to Emily:  
In considering it, the analyst could then appreciate to the 
full the patient's pattern of behaviour--that she had 
indeed been attempting to stimulate him, only to disappoint 
him later; no climax, as such, having been permitted by the 
patient to occur (Rowley, 1951, p. 192).  
 
Rowley’s (1951) understanding of the case and his write-up are redolent 
of Freud and Dora. Like Freud (1905), operating from within a paradigm 
that didn’t leave room for his subjectivity, Rowley is woefully unaware 
of his own presence in the analysis or of his countertransferential 
feelings toward his young patient. As a result, he seems equally 
oblivious to how he may be a co-participant in their impasse. 
 
Weiner’s Case: Impasse as Structural Conflict  
 When the clinician’s contributing role in shaping impasse did 
first become an area of inquiry, it was initially only insofar as the 
therapist failed to effectively manage the patient. The literature 
warns that impasse may ensue if the therapist errs by failing to be a 
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blank slate and gratifying the patient’s transference wishes or 
mismanaging the patient’s projections.  
 In his book, The Psychotherapeutic Impasse, Weiner (1982), 
writing from the vantage of ego psychology, illustrates a section on 
transference-related impasse with a case involving a woman seeking 
treatment at the behest of her husband. Mrs. L’s husband is discouraged 
by her strained relationship with his mother, and further wishes Mrs. L 
to adopt his faith. The treatment never gets traction, though. Despite 
the therapist’s efforts at free association, increasing the number of 
sessions, and disclosing his countertransference attraction to the 
patient, they are never able to move out of a stalled therapy.  
 After initially agreeing to end treatment, the patient becomes 
angered. She doesn’t want termination and sues her therapist. Weiner 
(1982) frames this scenario as a sort of negative therapeutic reaction, 
whereby an intervention serves only to make the patient worse (Atwood, 
Stolorow, & Trop, 1989). According to Weiner (1982), it is a case in 
which, “the therapist colluded with Mrs. L’s transference wish to act 
out her unconscious sadistic urges toward her parents in the form of 
passive obstructionism with him” (p. 70). Weiner sees the same 
“obstructionism” in her interactions with her mother-in-law and her 
husband’s minister. He further understands that “her id had been 
satisfied with the discharge of her sadistic impulses. Her superego and 
ego were satisfied because her id impulses were adequately disguised by 
their passive means of expression” (Weiner, 1982, p 70).  
 Weiner (1982) attributes the therapist’s failure to see clearly 
this complex dynamic to his guilt over his attraction to her. This 
interpretation could be construed as an effort to incorporate the 
therapist’s countertransference into the case. But therapist and 
patient continue to be held apart. Weiner does not appear curious about 
  12 
the ways in which therapist and patient, together, contribute to an 
impasse dynamic. Furthermore, in his overall assessment of impasse, 
Weiner characterizes it as a mistake. Thus not only is the impasse 
itself problematic, but the therapist who finds himself in the midst of 
one must contend with the ways in which he has erred to have landed 
himself there in the first place.  
 
Early Solutions  
 Prior to the 1990s, much of the literature on impasse was 
prescriptive and generalizable. It seemed to suggest that only nominal 
differences existed among impasse experiences. All that was needed to 
find one’s way through was a straightforward diagnosis matched with its 
corresponding prescription. Weiner (1982) provides a list of 10 “tools” 
a therapist can utilize in diagnosing impasse. He follows with steps 
for treating impasse, including interpretation, clarification, 
confrontation, consultation, or transfer to another clinician. Reading 
these remedies feels akin to discovering a metaphorical doctor’s bag 
brimming with simple impasse cures.  
 In a classical rendering, the primary solution to impasse was 
interpretation that made manifest the patient’s resistance (Darwin, 
1999; Freud, 1914). Yet even Freud (1914) recognized that 
interpretation may not be enough and could actually lead, at least 
initially, to impasse. In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,” 
Freud (1914) describes the disappointment of the beginning analyst who 
points out a resistance to her analysand, only to find the resistance 
intensified. Freud seems to suggest that interpretation is necessary, 
but insufficient, for working through resistance and impasse. 
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Toward a Contemporary Understanding of Impasse 
 By the early 1990s, the psychoanalytic depiction of impasse began 
to change. The literature charts a gradual move from the view of 
impasse as either a form of resistance in the patient or a sign of the 
therapist’s failure to interpret this resistance, to one in which 
impasse is intersubjective and expectable, though usually still 
dramatic. A belief that impasse lay exclusively within the patient 
began to give way to a shared focus on impasse as co-created by patient 
and therapist (Benjamin, 2009; Harris, 2009).  
 The relational school has been especially active in broadening 
this scope of inquiry. In keeping with a relational or intersubjective 
stance, relational thinkers have attempted to account for the 
subjectivities of both patient and analyst. By the late-90’s, Darwin 
(1999) notes, “[Impasse] now capture[s] a moment when the transference 
and the countertransference collude and/or collide” (p. 460). Infancy 
studies have further widened this perspective. Empirical infant 
research highlights the mutual regulation and rupture-repair cycles 
between infants and their caregivers, which in turn have been extended 
to an understanding of the exchanges between patients and analysts.  
 In his insightful paper, “Impasse Recollected,” Pizer (2004), a 
relational analyst, summarizes a literature on the range of 
contemporary ways in which impasse has been formulated. Similar to 
Darwin’s (1999) description, there can be impasse as the collision of a 
patient’s transference and a therapist’s vulnerabilities, as well as 
impasse as the result of a dyad in which patient and therapist are 
either too closely aligned or too divergent. Other formulations include 
impasse as a failure of therapist and patient to recognize one 
another’s subjectivities and communicate effectively intersubjectively; 
impasse as a deadening nonrelating in the dyad; impasse as a dangerous 
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reenactment or unexamined repetition; and impasse as a form of 
dissociation on the part of either patient or therapist.  
 Each of these scenarios considers the analyst’s role in impasse 
worthy of extended examination. As Benjamin (2009), a feminist 
psychoanalyst, notes, contemporary theorists and clinicians are 
increasingly open to accepting “the analyst’s role in contributing to 
breakdown, rather than simply being the one responsible for repairing 
it” (p. 442). No longer can we avoid the therapist’s contributions to 
impasse. Nor should we desire to.  
 Interestingly, Darwin (1999) elucidates how, even in the late-
‘90s, impasse continued to be equated with failure. In highlighting the 
risks--and risk taking--required of a therapist working through impasse 
relationally, Darwin (1999) writes,  
This way of working has created a new position for the 
therapist who, for the sake of the treatment, leaps outside 
the normal strictures of the frame and emerges either as the 
hero who saves the day or the bad therapist who fails her 
patient (p. 460).  
 
The stakes are high and the blame has shifted, so that it was the 
therapist’s failure alone:  
The added inducement for therapists to heroically leap is 
the change in perception…. Impasse used to be viewed 
tacitly as a failing in the patient. It is now viewed, 
implicitly and explicitly, as a failing on the therapist's 
part (Darwin, 1999, p. 469).  
 
Even as the general understanding of impasse became less punitive 
and critical, the definition of impasse-as-deficiency tenaciously 
found another foothold in the therapist.  
  
Pizer’s Case: Dissociation 
 Pizer (2004), presenting a current case of impasse, conveys how 
fraught the subject remains. He sets about unraveling what he calls a 
more “subtle” (p. 291) impasse experience, organized around “weak 
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dissociations” (p. 304). For the most part this treatment had been 
successful and rewarding. Nonetheless, Pizer (2004) sets himself, the 
therapist, the nearly impossible task of teasing out a sliver of 
interaction that may seem mundane but is in fact pivotal, the very crux 
of treatment:  
It is just this sort of moment, often seemingly innocuous, 
everyday, trivial--indeed, barely noticeable--that our next 
choice negotiates a step that will move the treatment into 
or out of impasse or perpetuate a subtle leitmotif of 
impasse that maintains its familiar (that is, undetected) 
grip in the relational field (p. 298). 
 
 Pizer (2004) goes on to recount his longtime work with one of his 
first patients. Rebecca begins treatment in her early 20s and their 
work together eventually spans nearly two decades. In the early stages, 
within the context of a withholding and deteriorating family, Rebecca 
is a volatile addict, highly dependent on Pizer who comes to suspect 
her alcoholic father of sexual abuse. She is demanding, manipulative, 
reckless, and frequently suicidal. Pizer finds himself accommodating 
Rebecca’s dependency: he takes frequent phone calls between sessions, 
accepts a low fee, and engages in occasional physical contact. This 
phase of their work ends with Rebecca markedly stabilized, yet abruptly 
ending treatment. Pizer comes to see that their early therapy was not 
about narrative exploration. Instead, he acted as a sustaining and 
holding environment for Rebecca. He concludes that he largely 
“survived” (Pizer, 2004, p. 294) this stage of their treatment--the 
import of which should not to be underestimated in navigating impasse.  
 Thirteen years later, Rebecca seeks out Pizer (2004) again, 
apologizing for her behavior years earlier. She reveals that she 
recovered memories of having been extensively sexually abused by her 
father, which she reentered another therapy to work through. Rebecca 
thanks Pizer, telling him that she had been unable to address the 
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abuse--which Pizer (2004) describes as having been “nonnegotiable, or 
impassable” (p. 295) between the two of them. “You did everything 
right” Rebecca tells Pizer (2004). “You stood by me. I felt loved and 
sheltered. You made it possible for me to stay alive long enough, until 
I was ready to face the work I had to do” (p. 294).  
 About a year later, Rebecca asks to reenter therapy. Toward the 
end of this five-year analysis, Pizer (2004) identifies the pivotal 
exchange. Their encounter is wonderfully complex, holding all the 
intricacy, muddle, and promise of impasse. Rebecca arrives to her final 
session of the week breathless and late. She asks whether Pizer has 
extra time at the end. He is torn. Knowing that he does have the time, 
wanting to hold the frame, yet loathe to deny Rebecca so small a 
request, Pizer (2004) replies, “Probably.” Rebecca then announces that 
they will stop at their usual time, adding, “Good. Now I know. It's 
excellent that I asked the question” (p. 297).  
 Pizer (2004) offers us a glimpse into the myriad thoughts running 
through his mind in this moment: Does he comment on the exchange, which 
seems so ripe, nudging their relationship into the fore? Or does he 
allow Rebecca to go on with whatever she so pressingly needs to discuss 
that day? His process brings me back to Behar’s photographer at the 
Colombian mudslide, wavering between action and inaction.  
 Eventually Pizer (2004) does ask. He and Rebecca share with one 
another what each had been grappling with internally during their 
brief, four-sentence exchange. And with Rebecca’s reply, the entire 
course of therapy shifts, moving them toward the start of termination: 
Rebecca proceeded to elaborate, for herself and for me, her 
own reflective formulation of the meaning of her 
therapeutic and analytic experience with me over time. She 
said, “I think I said we'd end at 10 partly to take care of 
you--to spare you the tension and the struggle. But it's 
more than that--more than just taking care of you. It's 
also about my being a peer of yours and sharing the 
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responsibility here for our relationship, and our 
boundaries…. And of course there are moments when I want to 
stay really little and have you be big and take care of me. 
But we're also peers. I've thought of you as older, even 
though you're not that much older. But I've needed to see 
you as the one who's older … and takes care of me. But now 
it's more like you're about five minutes older than me. And 
I can take some responsibility between us. I mean--yes, I 
need to be filled inside and surrounded on the outside by 
peace and comfort--it's like twinning with people. But it's 
a repetition--there's no growth in it. It's like turkey and 
stuffing and gravy--it's the same every year for 48 years. 
It's a comforting Thanksgiving ritual, but it never 
changes. Three minutes of more time would be a repetition 
of the same. And holding to the boundary means I can long 
for more but choose otherwise. And I can help you choose--
not just leave it up to you” (Pizer, 2004, pp. 299-300). 
 
Rebecca’s commentary offers a window onto the artfully co-created, 
intersubjective work that relational clinicians strive for.  
 Pizer (2004) uses her reflections to illustrate how easily we are 
pulled into doing things as we have always done them, how impasse can 
develop around simple inertia. By choosing one path--questioning 
whether Rebecca might have been asking about more than just the time at 
which their session would end--he creates the space for forward 
movement and a deliberately articulated growth. 
 Yet Pizer’s (2004) central concern seems to be what might have 
happened had he not asked? What course would their treatment have taken 
if he had let himself be pulled into and carried through a familiar 
enactment? By way of an answer, Pizer (2004) confesses,  
I still can shudder when I think of how that threshold 
moment with Rebecca might so easily have played out 
differently. Embedded as I was in the weak dissociations of 
our special and familiar kinship, I could so easily have 
failed to inquire into the small detail of three minutes. 
But impasse is often in the details (p. 304).  
 
Certainly impasse does lie in the details as much as in the drama. But 
I wonder, had Pizer not commented at this moment would there not have 
been another? Must even the possibility of entertaining a “leitmotif of 
impasse” (Pizer, 2004, p. 192) still induce one to shudder?  
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Enactment 
 The notion of enactment evolved along lines similar to that of 
impasse. In the broadest characterization, enactment is any relational 
entanglement played out between patient and therapist (Ginot, 2009; 
Renik, 2006). Yet like impasse, the term can encompass a range of 
experiences. Aron (2003b) offers a definition that captures this 
breadth: Enactment refers to “both the continual interactive dimension 
of all psychoanalytic process and to special and unique incidences in 
which unconscious variables are played out in either subtle or more 
dramatic form between patient and analyst” (p. 627). 
 Instances of discrete, dramatic enactments include the startling 
story of a patient who collapsed to the floor where he was joined by 
his therapist, on whose shoulder he eventually ended up sobbing 
(Davies, 2000), as well as the time another boldly let himself into his 
therapist’s office, while it was still locked (M. Black, personal 
communication, February 27, 2010). The idea of enactment as more 
continuous describes a general and gradual pattern of interaction 
flavored by a patient’s past relationships that unfolds over time. 
Pizer (2004) understands Rebecca’s request for a longer session and his 
response as an enactment. While her request represents a discrete 
enactment, the interchange that unfolds is of the more gradual variety. 
It both reenacts Rebecca’s earlier relational patterns as well as the 
rhythms of relating that had developed between Pizer and Rebecca over 
time. 
 Many relational therapists consider enactment inevitable, even 
necessary, before truly meaningful work can begin (Darwin, 1999; 
Davies, 1994). Some clinicians use the concepts of enactment and 
impasse interchangeably (Ginot, 2009). Burnstein and Cheifetz (1999) 
introduce the term “impasse enactments” (p. 74) to describe this 
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relationship, while Stern (2003) defines impasse as a dramatic kind of 
enactment. For the purposes of this paper, I will continue to consider 
impasse and enactment as separate but entwined phenomena.  
 
Rupture and Repair 
 As I now shift from a relational to an infant studies perspective 
on impasse, it’s worth noting that these demarcations are somewhat 
arbitrary. Relational thinkers have embraced the study of infancy just 
as many of those conducting infant research do so from a vantage 
informed by relational theory. Rupture and repair is one mode of 
thinking that holds saliency for impasse but could as easily appear 
under the rubric of relational theory as under the heading of infancy 
studies. However, its utility for managing impasse, which can be 
conceptualized as a failure to repair rupture, lies in the set of 
nonverbal and procedural cues that pass back and forth between mother 
and infant during times of rupture and subsequent repair.  
 The field of infancy research has extrapolated empirical findings 
from observing mother-infant dyads to the therapist-patient 
relationship. Benjamin (1995), a relational analyst steeped in the 
study of infancy, elaborates the essential role that rupture and repair 
play in early infant-caregiver interactions. “One of the main 
principles of the early dyad,” Benjamin (1995) explains, “is that 
relatedness is characterized not by continuous harmony but by 
continuous disruption and repair” (p. 47). This non-harmonious but ever 
reparative way of relating continues throughout the lifecycle.  
 An example of rupture and repair between a mother and child might 
unfold as follows: A mother matches her baby’s squeals of delight with 
hand clapping and an enthusiastic gaze. This moment of gleeful 
attunement is ruptured when the infant becomes over-stimulated. Arching 
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her back, she turns away from her mother, who continues to lean forward 
and clap excitedly. The repair begins as the mother, recognizing her 
baby’s discomfort, stops clapping and helps the infant re-regulate by 
matching her less-engaged state. Soothed, the infant is able to resume 
eye contact and the dyad moves forward, in sync once more (Walker, 
2008). Infancy theorists postulate that much of this mutual recognition 
and regulation goes on outside the conscious awareness of either 
partner. Yet the ability to tune into unspoken modes of communicating 
offers recourse in times of impasse.  
 Benjamin (1995) locates the mutuality of the mother-infant dyad 
in the analyst and patient, emphasizing that, “The concept of mutual 
recognition should include the notion of breakdown, of failure to 
sustain that tension, as well as account for the possibility of repair 
after failure” (p. 22). Within this framework, rupture becomes an 
inescapable part of all relationships from infancy on, including the 
treatment relationship. Thus, the rupture that constitutes impasse can 
be considered normative. The emphasis lies on the ability of the 
analyst to facilitate restoration and repair. Breakdown is viewed as 
part of what allows the infant, or patient, to internalize an ability 
to tolerate and regulate difficult emotions and learn to “transform 
disconnection into reconnection” (Walker, 2008, p. 6).  
 We are able to repair the therapeutic relationship by tolerating 
and working through the pain of rupture. This restoration holds until 
the next impassable moment takes shape. Yet with each turn of the 
cycle, the hope is that patient and therapist become better able to 
withstand moments of impasse and more adept at reconnection (Benjamin, 
2009; Maroda, 1999; Walker, 2008).   
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Contemporary Solutions 
 In her paper tracing the changes in perception of impasse over 
time, Darwin (1999) poses the question: “What is necessary and what is 
sufficient to resolve impasse?” (p. 469).  
 Infancy theorists might offer that knowing these moments are 
survivable is sufficient. Relational theorists might suggest that the 
experience must be spoken--articulated and scrutinized besides being 
enacted--in order for clinician and patient to grasp and make thinkable 
their roles in the impasse dynamic. Hoffman (1999), a relational 
analyst, calls for conscious verbal interpretation--not dissimilar from 
a classical technique--to pull us through and make room for reflection:   
At the very moment that he interprets, the analyst often 
extricates himself as much as he extricates the patient… The 
interpretation is “mutative” (Stratchy, 1934) partly because 
it has a certain reflexive impact on the analyst himself 
which the patient senses. Because it is implicitly self-
interpretive it modifies something in the analyst’s own 
experience of the patient (p. 65).   
 
Though from a truly relational position, what is thought to be 
“mutative” is less the interpretation and more the space created for a 
mutual pondering and being. By engaging the patient in shared 
reflection, the analyst is valuing the patient’s ability to interpret, 
understand, and empathize.  
 In exploring the “heroic” acts taken by relationally-oriented 
clinicians to resolve impasse, Darwin (1999) makes an interesting 
observation. She points to a symmetry in the therapists’ responses to 
their patients: “Hoffman's patient acted a little crazy in the 
colloquial sense and Hoffman acted a little crazy as well. Davies' 
patient expressed his desire and she responded with her expression of 
comparable desire” (p. 464). (Darwin, 1999) goes on, 
To be effective, the intervention has to indicate to the 
patient that resolving the impasse is as important to the 
therapist as to the patient. Despite the inequity inherent 
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in the fact that the patient has only one therapist while 
the therapist has many patients, the therapist must show 
parity of emotional investment (p. 469). 
 
Perhaps what is therapeutic about impasse, then, is the way in which it 
brings into relief and makes palpable the therapist’s all-in investment 
in the relationship. 
 
Summary 
 With the shift away from understanding impasse as a mistake--the 
hallmark of a failed treatment, good for little more than causing the 
patient unnecessary discomfort (Weiner, 1982)--has come a significant 
recognition of the potential impasse holds for therapeutic growth and 
change. There lie opportunities in the cracks in our relationships. 
 Relational analysts recommend we embrace impasse as vital and 
indispensable. Ringstrom (1998) describes a treatment marked by not 
one, but a series of impasses. He and his patient together bear the 
feeling of “damned if I do, damned if I don’t.” In the end, Ringstrom 
(1998) concludes, what they experienced were “essential impasses, 
transformative in their resolution” (p. 315). Infancy researchers have 
also shown how dyadic repair and survival can be curative, the 
manifestation of a mutually constructed treatment tended to by both 
therapist and patient. 
 The language used to depict the transformative potential of 
impasse frequently involves a spatial metaphor. Whether described as 
thirdness (Benjamin, 2009; Ogden, 1986), the liberating wingspread of 
freedom and change (Pizer, 2004), standing in the spaces (Bromberg, 
1996), mutually reflective space (Ginot, 2009), or additional space for 
the therapist’s subjectivity (Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin, & Sorter, 
2005), this language articulates a powerful and promising new expanse.  
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 In the murky encounters with strong affect, difficult enactments, 
and painful rupture as well as the muddling through less eventful, more 
habitual aspects of the therapeutic encounter, lies hope. The work of 
therapy is a constant negotiation and renegotiation, sticking and un-
sticking. At times we must stand still, or even step backward, before 
we can move through. Because really, it is all impasse.  
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARD A RELATIONAL THEORY OF IMPASSE 
 
 
Relationality is what defines us. 
--Stephen A. Mitchell, Relationality: From Attachment to 
Intersubjectivity 
 
 At heart, relational theory is discursive, a meta-theory pulling 
from and building upon the psychoanalytic traditions that came before 
it. Beneath the relational umbrella, schools whose perspectives had 
been treated as irreconcilable--notably ego psychology, Kleinian 
theory, and British object relations--were integrated and brought into 
conversation. Among others, the relational model has drawn heavily from 
object relations and interpersonal theory, both dating back to the 
1950s (Mitchell & Black, 1995), as well as contemporary self psychology 
and intersubjective theory (Benjamin, 1995).  
 The beginning of the relational movement was marked by the 1983 
publication of Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell’s Object Relations in 
Psychoanalytic Theory. Greenberg and Mitchell coined the term 
“relational” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xvii) to describe a group of 
theorists who had replaced the traditional emphasis on libidinal and 
aggressive drives with a focus on relational needs. While Greenberg and 
Mitchell viewed their psychoanalytic approach as an “alternative” 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xiii) to the classical drive model, some 
critics have argued that this distinction actually creates a false 
dichotomy between the two theories (Mills, 2005). 
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 Benjamin (1995), a relational analyst, perhaps captures the 
relational movement best with her pithy and discursive play on Freud’s 
(1933), “Where id was, ego must be” (p. 79). In suggesting, “Where 
objects are, subjects must be” (p. 29), Benjamin (1995) modifies 
Freud’s explication of the role psychoanalysis plays in mediating the 
different structures of mind. Instead, she proposes, analysis can 
mediate our way of relating to one another. 
  The American relational tradition coalesced in the mid-1990s 
around a group of psychoanalytic clinicians and scholars trained in 
feminism, sociology, philosophy, and anthropology. Postmodernism was in 
ascendency, and constructivism advanced the questioning of longstanding 
psychoanalytic tenets, such as the analyst’s objectivity and 
abstinence, the rigidity of the frame, and the feasibility of extending 
a single theory of mind to a wide range of people (Mills, 2005). As a 
result, within a relational framework, the analyst is no longer 
considered the expert, context is of vital importance, universals are 
believed to be rare, and meaning is thought to be shaped by the 
interpersonal realm in which it comes into being (D. Stern, personal 
communication, December 5, 2009). 
 In his tribute to Stephen Mitchell, the psychoanalyst regarded as 
the principle founder of the relational school, Aron (2003a) notes 
Mitchell’s skill for finding a third way--“an alternative reconciling 
the tension between the first two” (p. 273)--whether among seemingly 
disparate theoretical orientations, or in conflicting approaches to a 
clinical impasse. The same dialectical approach has been said to 
characterize the larger relational movement, and its attempts to 
support the tension between internal and external, intrapsychic and 
interpersonal, past and present, fantasy and reality.  
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 As an analytic theory of mind, the roots of the relational model 
lie in a Freudian understanding of the primacy of the unconscious, the 
patient’s resistance to uncomfortable desires, the significance of 
fantasy, transference toward the analyst, and the persistent residue of 
the patient’s past. While classical analytic technique calls for a 
withholding analyst to frustrate the patient, leaving the analyst’s own 
subjectivity outside the consulting room, a relational approach shifts 
the locus of work. Rather than a primarily intrapsychic focus on the 
patient, it creates space for the interpersonal, though the two remain 
entwined. As Mitchell (2000) describes it, 
Interpersonal relational processes generate intrapsychic 
relational processes which reshape interpersonal processes 
reshaping intrapsychic processes, on and on in an endless 
Möbius strip in which internal and external are perpetually 
regenerating and transforming themselves and each other (p. 
57). 
 
 Both participants in the analysis and the way in which they 
interact become relevant to a treatment that pivots on the dynamic and 
reciprocal, though asymmetrical, relationship between patient and 
practitioner. According to Mitchell (2000), “In the broad sea change in 
the ways in which the analytic process is now understood and 
envisioned, the analytic relationship, the personal relationship 
between the two participants, is now granted a fundamental, 
transformative role” (p. 64). A relational approach places considerably 
greater emphasis on the present than does classical analysis. 
Particular attention is given to the way relational patterns learned in 
the past become lived and enacted in the therapeutic relationship. This 
acknowledgement and exploration of the conscious, present moment 
interaction of patient and analyst as a device for and site of change 
stands among the most significant breaks from classical technique. 
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Relational Theory and Impasse 
 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, relational thinkers are among 
those most interested in the phenomenon of impasse. Clinicians working 
relationally have been at the forefront of shifting the spotlight of 
impasse from patient to a shared illumination of the patient-therapist 
dyad and, more recently, clinician alone. This can be seen reflected in 
the literature. Over a hundred papers in which analysts relay some 
experience with clinical impasse have been published in the relational 
journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues since its launch in 1991.  
 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, as I consider what a 
relational framework offers an understanding of impasse, transference-
countertransference dynamics particularly as seen through the 
phenomenon of enactment figure prominently.  
 
Countertransference and Enactment 
 While Freud (1905) eventually came to view transference as 
something that “cannot be evaded” (p. 116), he continued to hold that 
countertransference--in his estimation a sign of the analyst’s 
unresolved conflicts--should be (Chodorow, 1999). Enactment, first 
described as such in the mid-1980s, received similar treatment (Renik, 
2006). At the time, clinicians were trained to avoid enactments. If 
enactment did slip into treatment, the analyst was to control for 
damage and make the experience as therapeutically useful as possible. 
Renik (2006) and others (Suchet, 2004) have critiqued this view for 
converting enactment into a euphemism for what was previously and 
pejoratively called acting out.  
 Contemporary formulations of countertransference and enactment 
are considerably more expansive--both in terms of what is viewed as 
part of these phenomena as well as how they may be of therapeutic use. 
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Beyond the analyst’s thoughts and feelings about the patient or 
therapy, countertransference can include the therapist’s dissociation, 
missatunement, or defensiveness  (Benjamin, 2009). To a relational way 
of thinking, the essential question may not be so much what makes up 
countertransference, but rather: What is not countertransference?  
 Renik (2006) argues for taking a similar stance with enactment--
defined in the previous chapter as an entanglement played out, or 
enacted, between patient and therapist. He believes that enactment 
should no longer describe “particular events that sometimes occur in 
treatment, but a constant dimension of all treatment events” (Renik, 
2006, p. 91). Though I examine more discrete moments of enactment, 
Renik’s thinking is in keeping with a relational approach. It also 
underscores one of the major premises of this project: That 
countertransference, enactment, and impasse cannot “be minimized, let 
alone eliminated, from analytic treatment” (Renik, 2006, p. 91). They 
should not be considered obstacles, but rather equally a part of 
“unproductive” as well as “productive interactions between patient and 
analyst”(Renik, 2006, p. 91).  
 Like impasse, moments of enactment can leave a patient and 
therapist feeling precariously entangled, or else vastly apart (Ginot, 
2009). What enactment does, however, is allow us in. As clinicians we 
enter the experience of the patient, able to get a little further 
inside the patient’s internal object world (Benjamin, 2009; Bridges, 
2005; Darwin, 1999). And often what relational clinicians discover is 
that there are experiences and feelings impossible to verbalize or 
express in any other way (Ginot, 2009). Because of this, a number of 
contemporary theorists argue that enactment--which for some is 
interchangeable with impasse--is a necessary part of the treatment 
process. Clinicians embracing this thinking believe enactment 
  29 
unconsciously alerts the therapist to the necessity of engaging with a 
previously unknown aspect of the patient (Bromberg, 2003). Davies 
(1994) explains,   
We assume--indeed, we rely upon--the hope that analyst and 
patient together will become enmeshed in complicated 
reenactments of early, unformulated experiences with 
significant others that can shed light upon the patient’s 
current interpersonal and intrapsychic difficulties by 
reopening in the analytic relationship prematurely 
foreclosed areas of experience (p. 156). 
 
Davies (1994) goes on to say, “The analytic space provides the backdrop 
against which previously foreclosed experiences can be reopened, 
mastered, and more effectively integrated within an internal system 
that no longer views such moments as overwhelming and dangerous” (p. 
157). This might be described as a repetition compulsion model of 
enactment, whereby the patient uses therapy to belatedly master a past 
relational difficulty (M. Stark, personal communication, March 28, 
2009). 
 Within enactment tinged by repetition, the patient may become, 
for example, a traumatizing parent and the therapist a traumatized 
child, or vice versa. M. Stark (personal communication, March 28, 
2009), a psychoanalyst informed by relational theory, understands that 
it can be too painful for the patient to have a relational encounter 
unfold in any way other than how it had in the past. To do so would 
mean the patient’s earlier relationships could have been different as 
well. The impasse, then, provides an opportunity for the patient to 
achieve mastery, a transformative reworking.  
 
Davies’ Case: Enactment in Therapeutic Action  
 Perhaps the most iconic representation--and one of the more 
controversial--of a contemporary, relational understanding of impasse, 
in which enactment plays a prominent role, is Davies (1994) paper “Love 
  30 
in the Afternoon.” Davies comes to understand the impasse that develops 
between herself and her young male patient as the result of an 
enactment recalling his erotic relationship with his mother. His mother 
was overtly seductive toward Mr. M, yet became punitive and rejecting 
if ever he responded to her advances (Darwin, 1999).  
 In treatment, Mr. M has repeated a pattern of fantasizing erotic 
relationships with the women he encounters, but imagining himself too 
unattractive and weak to ever have his feelings reciprocated. He has 
shared with Davies (1994) a highly erotic transference, relaying sexual 
fantasies involving Davies that she describes as “almost poetic” (p. 
163). But in the next breath he invariably becomes self-loathing, 
declaring it impossible that his feelings could ever be shared.   
 Davies (1994) eventually chooses to disclose to Mr. M her own 
erotic feelings toward him. She believes it is the only way for him to 
know that he alone has not created the sexual undercurrent in the room 
--in the same way that his childhood feelings were not his alone. Just 
as Mr. M finds himself attracted to Davies, she, too, feels attraction 
for and fantasizes about him.  
 Initially, Mr. M is horrified and furious at the 
countertransference revelation. He threatens to sue, insisting that 
Davies (1994) has overstepped a boundary. But later he comes to 
understand--in a way interpretation had not been able to convey--that 
his mother may have struggled with her own erotic feelings for him. He 
can begin to entertain the possibility that it was her own shame, not 
anything wrong or repulsive in him, which his mother was responding to. 
Davies revelation allows the impasse, in this case the repetition, to 
shift. 
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Managing Impasse Relationally 
 So how do we manage? The relational literature suggests leaning 
into impasse. The clinician cannot conduct a perfect treatment, but can 
acknowledge disruptions and continually engage in the process of 
discussing and rectifying these rifts.  
 Benjamin (2009) insists that therapists take responsibility for 
their failures, whether the result of dissociation, lapses, or personal 
vulnerabilities. Clinicians must give up the fantasy of being a 
“complete container” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 442) and instead submit to 
knowing that at times we will cause pain, hurt, even harm. In place of 
this fantasy, we avail ourselves of the dyad’s ability to withstand: 
“The idea that both participants in the analytic dyad survive--or 
perhaps more properly said come back to life subsequent to--the other’s 
failure is the principle to which an analyst needs recourse during 
impasse and lesser breakdowns” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 442). Recognizing 
and enduring impasse can be excruciatingly difficult and near 
impossible in the moment. At times, the best we can do is wait for the 
next session or the right time in order to open what has transpired to 
conversation (Benjamin, 2009).  
 
Mitchell’s Cases 
 Aron (2003a) locates Mitchell’s genius for “navigating clinical 
stalemates” (p. 273) in his creativity, transparency, and patience:  
When dealing with therapeutic impasses, Mitchell learned to 
tolerate, sustain, and identify the entrapped states in 
which he found himself until he could free his imagination 
and gradually discover some third avenue along which to 
proceed (p. 273). 
 
Often this involved Mitchell bringing his patient into his process, 
letting her know how trapped he felt by the only apparent options. 
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 Mitchell (2000) describes one such impasse with Helen, a 
corporate executive who brings her explosive anger to treatment. They 
alternate between periods of working together successfully and times 
when Helen becomes so furious she storms out of treatment. Mitchell, in 
turn, vacillates between warm and loving feelings and strong 
frustration and anger. Finally, after one of her rageful outbursts, 
Helen taunts: “I know you are hating me. Why don’t you just come out 
and say it. Look, if we were out on the street, if this weren’t an 
analytic relationship, what would you say to me right now?” Mitchell 
(2000), feeling trapped, responds, “If this were not an analytic 
relationship, if this were out on the street and you were talking to me 
this way and I weren’t your analyst, I probably would say ‘FUCK YOU!’ 
But I am your analyst” (p. 142). They both end up laughing. 
 What finally moves Mitchell and Helen out of their interactive 
pattern--their impasse--is their ability to straddle two spaces at 
once. Mitchell (2000) understands their interaction on multiple levels:  
She had somehow managed to risk confronting me fully with 
her hatred while, at the same time, suggesting a kind of 
transitional space, in the imagined confrontation in the 
street, in which we might play it out. I had somehow 
managed to find a way to express my rage and, at the same 
time, to signal to her that I was not unmindful of my 
responsibility to take care of her and the process, of 
which I was the guardian (p. 142). 
 
Mitchell (2000) is able to hold two roles, and let Helen into his 
feelings about each. He responds authentically as himself, but remains 
aware of his position as the analyst. He is both in the experience and 
able to reflect on it. 
 In recounting another case--his work with Becky, a 30-year-old 
history graduate student in her fifth year of treatment--Mitchell 
(2000) describes an impasse that results from a reenactment of her 
interactions with her parents:  
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She had expressed considerable anger at me. I had been 
missing how much trouble she was having, she claimed. 
Perhaps I was misled by her apparent success at school, not 
noticing how depressed and anxious she often felt about how 
blocked she was in the papers she was supposed to be 
writing…. I thought there was some truth to Becky’s 
charge…. We explored some of the ways in which she and I 
had recently been drifting…along into a joint created sense 
of complacence regarding her external successes (p. 71). 
  
Theirs is an experience not unlike the lulling, dissociated repetitions 
described by Pizer (2004). Mitchell and Becky find a way out not 
through interpretation, but rather the shared, lived experience of 
dialogic exchange. They begin talking about her writing projects, 
something she was not able to do with her parents. As a result, 
Mitchell (2000) writes, “I felt we had managed to cocreate the kind of 
experience she had never had with her parents, whose narcissistic 
concerns and investments made an enjoyment of Becky’s own creativity 
either irrelevant or too threatening” (p. 72). Mitchell does not dwell 
on their impasse, but rather heeds what Becky says she needs from him. 
 
Summary 
 Among relational clinician writing on impasse, one consensus 
seems to be that often--though not always--these moments can be 
resolved through verbal communication (Davies, 1994; Ginot, 2009; 
Maroda, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Renik, 2006; M. Stark, personal 
communication, March 28, 2009). This frequently requires some form of 
self-disclosure. Maroda (1999) outlines how,  
Often the road to reconciliation and reconnection following 
inevitable ruptures or mutual negations involves the use of 
self-disclosure. Each person admits his or her feelings, 
differences are aired, and attempts are made at 
understanding and forgiving. Once again the relationship is 
repaired even though each person knows that eventually it 
will be ruptured anew. And they cycle continues. Without 
the use of self-disclosure we have no method of adequately 
exploring this deep and complicated relational pattern (p. 
488). 
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Disclosure is admittedly a complex undertaking, whether it takes the 
shape of revealing shared feelings, as Davies (1994) did; acknowledging 
and surviving the therapist’s failures, like Benjamin (2009) 
recommends; or Mitchell’s (2000) revelation of feeling trapped. 
Benjamin (2009) explains the power of such transparency: “Such action 
is meant to show that the analyst can change, can model the 
transformational process, and that revealing her struggle to do so also 
transforms the analytic process into one of mutual listening to 
multiple voices” (p. 450). By choosing self-disclosure, the therapist 
conveys to the patient a willingness and ability to survive, 
acknowledge, and explore her participation in impasse (Ginot, 2009). 
 M. Stark (personal communication, March 28, 2009) suggests that 
one way of opening up impasse for conversation is by acknowledging the 
necessity of enactment, particularly in light of the therapist’s 
inability to initially recognize some piece of the patient’s 
experience. Like Renik (2006), Stark believes in respectfully framing 
the patient’s activities not as acting out, but rather as a necessary 
communication.  
 Does this mean that had the therapist been listening harder or 
hearing more clearly, the patient would not have had to resort to 
enactment or impasse in order to be understood? Relational analysts 
surmise there may actually be no other way for a patient to make 
certain experiences, including trauma, understood (Schore, 2002). If 
not drawn into participating with the patient, the therapist may be 
missing an opportunity for knowing a part of the patient.   
 In the previous chapter, Darwin (1999) conveyed the importance of 
the therapist’s investment in the relationship. We must first allow 
ourselves to be pulled into the messiness, into an enactment, in order 
to be able to get back out. The therapist’s willingness and 
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availability to impasse communicates empathy, while the effort to 
reflect on and work through impasse in conversation with the patient 
signals a commitment to the therapy (Ginot, 2009). If this can be done 
effectively, “Together therapist and patient rework the patient’s 
narrative and rewrite the patient’s story”(Ganzer, 2007, p. 118). 
Relational theorists have suggested that meaning is not only discovered 
but also created (Leary, 1995; Mills, 2005), a notion that holds 
especially true of the meaning that emerges from impasse.  
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CHAPTER IV 
TOWARD AN INFANCY RESEARCH THEORY OF IMPASSE 
 
 
Psychoanalysis is not “the talking cure,” but more precisely “the 
communicating cure.”  
--Allan Schore, Affect Regulation and the Repair of the Self 
  
 In the previous chapter I considered a relational approach to 
impasse, one that often calls for verbal communication between analyst 
and patient. But what happens when talking is not enough? Or spoken 
narrative is not possible? In this chapter, I turn to nonverbal 
communication, another avenue for navigating impasse as elucidated by 
infancy studies, an offshoot of attachment theory.    
 Though they developed in parallel, mainstream mid-20th century 
psychoanalysis initially rejected attachment theory. As a result of his 
behavioral approach and concern with adaptation to the real world, 
British psychoanalyst John Bowlby’s ideas were considered too material 
and mechanistic, better suited to research than analysis (Mitchell, 
1999). Mitchell suggests that the intrapsychic model of Freudian and 
Kleinian drive theory left little room for concern with lived 
relationships. Bowlby, on the other hand, centered his work on the real 
relationship between mother and child. In 1980, Bowlby wrote:  
Intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub 
around which a person’s life revolves, not only when he is 
an infant or a toddler or a school child but throughout his 
adolescence and his years of maturity as well, and on into 
old age (Mitchell, 1999, pp. 90-91). 
 
 While Bowlby’s placement of human relationships at the center of 
his work posed a challenge to the psychoanalysis of his day, today it 
has moved him into the pantheon of the precursors to the relational 
movement (Mitchell, 1999). In fact, relational psychoanalysts have 
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deemed empirical infant studies--with roots in the attachment work of 
Bowlby and American psychologist Mary Ainsworth (Shilkret & Shilkret, 
2008)--the contemporary body of work currently having the greatest 
impact on psychoanalytic ideas (Harris, 1997).  
 
The Study of Infancy 
 Analysts initially looked to infant research as a means of 
helping deepen their understanding of their patients’ early childhoods. 
Now a more explicit connection is being drawn between the interaction 
of infant-caregiver and patient-analyst. Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin, and 
Sorter (2003) hypothesize that the preverbal communication of infants 
corresponds with nonverbal and implicit communication in adults, most 
of which occurs outside conscious awareness. The basic process of this 
nonverbal communication remains consistent, though not identical, 
across the lifespan (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). As a result, the 
empirical work of infancy studies can be extrapolated to patient and 
analyst interactions in treatment. Clinicians working off an infancy 
framework are able to call on a variety of methods beyond the spoken 
word for engaging their patients. These include implicit behavioral and 
procedural modes of interaction. 
 A shift in the study of infancy occurred in the 1970s. As in the 
relational field, where the dyad became the primary area of inquiry, 
infant researchers began to focus not only on the caregiver’s impact on 
the infant, but on the bidirectional, mutual flow of influence between 
the two. Lachmann (2001), a psychoanalyst, describes this as the “era 
of the constructionist infant, the infant coconstructing its world in 
interaction with its environment” (p. 168). Beebe (Beebe & Lachmann, 
2002), a psychoanalyst and infant researcher, movingly captures both 
the infant’s responsiveness and influence as she describes the 
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encounter that cemented her decision to study mother-infant 
reciprocity:  
I remember one particular day when I played with a baby 
whose face was full of joy. As I watched her face 
responding to mine, going up and up and up, tears came to 
my eyes. I was so moved by how closely she tracked my face 
and by her bursting into a sunbeam (p.3)  
 
While the baby’s sunbeam is a joyful response to Beebe, it is clear 
that the baby also exerts a powerful effect on Beebe.  
 Infant researchers suggest that even newborns have the innate 
ability to be in sympathetic communication with their caretakers, with 
“each aware of the other's feelings and purposes without words and 
language, by matching communicative expressions through time, form, and 
intensity” (Beebe, Rustin, Sorter, & Knoblauch, 2003, p. 812). 
Empirical research has elucidated the subtle, nonconscious dance of 
mutual engagement, disengagement, and reengagement that occurs in the 
early dyad. A similar sequence can be observed in the consulting room, 
where both patient and therapist hold sway over the steps and turns 
that are taken in the course of treatment (Beebe & Lachmann, 1998).  
 
Nonverbal Communication: Correspondence and Elaboration 
 Among the forms of preverbal interaction identified in infancy 
studies are matching, or corresponding, with the other. The notion of 
correspondence is consistent with the way therapists relate to their 
patients. By matching a patient’s expressions and nonverbal states, the 
therapist can “communicat[e] to the other a feeling of ‘being with’… a 
fundamental ingredient of intimacy” (Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, p. 
809). Yet infancy researchers note that a mother rarely exactly 
replicates her baby’s affect or behavior, but rather elaborates upon 
them. Similarly, by elaborating on what a patient has expressed, the 
therapist is able to widen the range of affect and experience available 
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to the dyad, as well as help the patient regulate distress. On 
occasion, a therapist may try a true matching, more closely aligning 
herself with the patient, being with the patient in whatever she is 
feeling--what Stern calls “sharing without altering” (Beebe et al., 
2005, p. 135).    
 By way of example of the escalation that can occur during a 
faithful and unmindful correspondence, Beebe (Beebe, Rustin, et al., 
2003) describes the problematic mutual escalation of infant and 
caretaker. As the infant becomes more distressed, her caretaker does as 
well: “Each partner then proceeds to match the other's increasing 
arousal and distress, each topping the other, going up and up and up, 
until the infant disorganizes, perhaps by vomiting (at four months) or 
screaming (at 12 months)”(Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, pp. 819-820).  
 Using Shakespeare’s Othello and Desdemona, Beebe illustrates a 
similarly distressed and dysregulated adult exchange. Both characters 
are so preoccupied with the content of their discussion that neither is 
able to grasp what is happening on a procedural level or attend to 
self- or mutual-regulation. They are at cross-purposes: Othello 
anguished over a possible affair between Desdemona and Casio, and 
Desdemona guilelessly pressing her case for Casio’s return to Othello’s 
army. The conversation escalates until neither lover can reassure the 
other, and Othello storms off stage. Their impasse ends unresolved, to 
say the least, with both lovers dead by the end of the play.  
 Done deliberately and with care, however, Beebe (Beebe, Rustin, 
et al., 2003) shows how matching negative states can be used as a form 
of distress regulation. She soothes 17-month-old Dan by remaining 
attuned and sympathetic to his responses, joining his dampened state:   
Dan suddenly became completely still, collapsing tonus with 
his head down. The stranger became similarly still and 
waited. After half a minute, Dan looked up from under his 
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brows, with his head still partially down. The stranger 
very softly said, “Hello, it's okay.” Dan then looked down 
again, and became motionless. Dan and the stranger cycled 
through this pattern many times over, for about two and a 
half minutes. Then, as suddenly as it came, it went, and 
Dan emerged partially smiling and gradually resumed play 
with the stranger (Beebe, Rustin, et al., p. 820).  
 
 Beebe, Rustin, et al. (2003) describes a similar, nonconscious 
matching of a distressed state in the psychoanalytic treatment of an 
adult patient. The therapist connects to her by reproducing the rhythms 
of the patient’s whimpers and cries:  
The patient was increasingly distressed, speaking tensely, 
gesturing rapidly with her hands, her torso leaning forward 
tautly, her face screwed into a precry. The analyst was 
silently listening, his face very attentive. As the 
patient's agitation began, the analyst slightly shifted the 
orientation of his chair toward the patient. Both 
maintained continuous eye contact. As the agitation 
mounted, the analyst's foot made intermittent brief, rapid 
jiggles, matching the rhythm of the patient's body. He then 
moved slightly forward in his chair. At this point the 
heads of both analyst and patient went up in a synchronous 
movement. At each escalation of the patient's agitation, 
the analyst participated, crossing and uncrossing his legs 
and nodding his head up and down in rhythm with the 
patient's movements and each time saying “Yes,” softly. 
Gradually the patient began to calm down; the analyst's 
head movements became slower. There were several long 
moments of silence. Then slowly they began to speak to each 
other… (Beebe, Rustin, et al., 2003, p. 832). 
 
The researchers clarify that what the therapist matches is not 
the intensity of the patient’s arousal, but the shifts in her 
arousal. By matching in this way, the therapist is able to convey 
that he is attuned and with his patient. I wonder, too, whether 
once the therapist was able to connect on an implicit level, if 
he began to slow and calm his movements as a way to help sooth 
the patient.  
 Beebe, Rustin, et al. (2003) suggest that correspondence in 
pleasure is one area of the infancy domain that has not been adequately 
picked up by adult psychoanalysis, where the emphasis remains on 
differentiation and conflict. Matching positive states can be critical 
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for sharing in the successes of treatment, facilitating the therapeutic 
alliance and a secure attachment (Beebe et al., 2005), as well as 
moving out of an impasse.  
 
Rupture and Repair 
 In addition to forms of corresponding, we see in both 
infant/caregiver and patient/therapist dyads the ongoing dialectics of 
rupture, or disruption, and repair; attunement and missattunement; 
engagement and disengagement. If we take as a given that these 
experiences are normative, we can then turn our attention to repair, 
re-attunement, and reengagement. The good enough caregiver whose infant 
becomes distressed in the face of her missattunment is able refocus and 
re-attune, thus helping regulate the infant (Schore, 2002). In adult 
treatment, “The goal is the restoration of recognition after its 
breakdown, which includes re-establishing the tension between 
differences and sameness, negation and recognition. Such restoration 
increases the patient's sense of agency and ability to contain pain and 
loss” (Beebe, Knoblauch, et al., 2003, pp. 761-762).  
 
Benjamin’s Case: A Bridge Between Relational Theory and Infancy Studies 
 In a recent paper, Benjamin (2009), whose work draws heavily on 
infancy studies, relays an impasse that occurred toward the end of a 
long analysis. Employing a contemporary relational approach, Benjamin 
(2009) turns the spotlight onto her own role in a therapy that becomes 
“lock[ed]-in” (p. 442). She shifts from viewing the analyst as solely 
responsible for repairing rupture to examining how she helped create 
the rift in the first place. Benjamin discovers that through her 
insistence on reassuring her patient, Hannah, whenever she berated 
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herself, that she was neglecting to truly acknowledge and accept 
Hannah’s “bad” self.    
 Benjamin (2009) readily admits to having failed to completely 
contain Hannah’s “shame and persecution” (p. 448). Yet she does not 
view this disruption--or the impasse that ensues--as a true failure. 
She and Hannah are able to strengthen and restore their relationship 
through dialogic repair. The therapist’s failure to contain, manage, 
and metabolize does not necessitate collapse: “What usually solidifies 
and makes intractable re-traumatization in the analytic dyad is not the 
enactment itself but the analyst’s failure to acknowledge, which the 
patient correctly grasps as the avoidable failure” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 
444). The harm a patient experiences is not owing to impasse, but the 
failure to acknowledge and work through it.  
 Benjamin (2009) and others (M. Stark, personal communication, 
March 28, 2009) note that breakdowns in the treatment relationship can 
be especially common when the work moves to an examination of trauma, 
where there may be “unlinked self-parts” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 443). 
Benjamin (2009) further “emphasize[s] that our ‘failure’ to link is 
inevitable…and not the failure it feels like” (p. 443). So impasse does 
not necessarily take shape as failure, after all. 
 
Relevance to Impasse 
 If impasse is conceptualized as a communication breakdown 
(Maroda, 1999), then one way to reopen communication is on the 
procedural, nonverbal level: “When language fails, the psychoanalytic 
dyad can still have access to prelinguistic and implicit forms of 
communicative competence and intersubjectivity”  (Beebe, Rustin, et 
al., 2003, p. 813). Schore (2009) further emphasizes that the primary 
process, right-brain to right-brain, nonverbal communication of the 
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infant and caregiver is the predominant form of communication when 
patient and therapist are caught in stressful clinical situations.  
 In describing the process of what occurs in the patient-analyst 
relationship--rather than simply the content of what is discussed--
infancy studies can expand the ways in which impasse is understood and 
managed (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). Of particular relevance are the 
assorted nonverbal domains that infancy theorists attend to in their 
research and clinical practice. After all, “An intersubjective field is 
more than just an interaction of two minds, but also of two bodies” 
(Schore, 2009, p. 133). Implicit communication can be conveyed through 
visual means, such as facial configurations and expressions; through 
the physical dimensions of touch, posture, gesture, and movement; and 
through auditory elements, including the prosodoy of vocalization 
(Beebe, Knoblauch, et al., 2003; Schore, 2009).  
 
Beebe’s Case: Early Trauma  
 Through her work with Dolores, over the course of a ten-year 
analysis, Beebe (Beebe, et al., 2005) demonstrates the use of infant 
research in adult treatment. Dolores is articulate and eloquent, a 
successful and sociable biology professor. But she shuts down, losing 
language as the treatment moves deeper into her early trauma and loss. 
Until age 5, when Dolores was adopted by a third family, she was 
emotionally, physically, and sexually abused as she shuttled back and 
forth between an abusive biological mother and a loving foster mother.  
 A feeling of impasse immediately sets in. From the start, Beebe 
(Beebe et al., 2005) recalls, “[Dolores] longed for an attachment to 
me, and yet she could not look at me, and often could not talk” (p. 
95). Beebe struggles to connect with her deeply disturbed and 
dissociated patient. What eventually opens up the treatment is Beebe’s 
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decision to reconfigure their seating. She situates her chair at a 
right angle to Dolores, with a small table between them, at a distance 
that approximates “that of usual adult face-to-face interaction…closer 
than usual face-to-face psychotherapy, but not as close as that between 
mother and infant” (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 104). In doing so, Beebe 
attends to the physical, their orientation, making herself more 
immediately present when Dolores enters a state of dissociation. 
 Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) sustains the treatment through 
additional nonverbal modes of interaction and connection. At various 
points, Beebe matches Dolores’ sounds, rhythm, and breath. She mirrors 
Dolores’ head and body orientation and gaze. Beebe also discovers that 
without realizing it, her movements and facial expressions have 
corresponded to Dolores’ dampened state. Much of this, Beebe 
acknowledges, occurs outside of her awareness, made available to her 
only as she reviews detailed videotapes of the sessions.  
 A second impasse sets in when Dolores discovers that Beebe (Beebe 
et al., 2005) is in a relationship with a man. For Dolores, this 
revelation recalls her lost and beloved foster mother. Her mother was 
with a man the last time Dolores saw her, and on some level Dolores 
believes he was responsible for taking her mother away. The enactment 
ruptures their fragile connection. Dolores describes the same feeling 
of being “kicked out” (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 115) with Beebe that she 
experienced with her mother as a small child. She hardly speaks to 
Beebe through six months of treatment. Part of what helps them move 
through this period is disclosure. Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) recalls,  
Slowly I came to terms with the idea that this theme had to 
emerge, that it would have happened sooner or later, and 
that it would be essential to her recovery. I also 
acknowledged to her that some of our difficulty was coming 
from something in me, something from my own childhood, that 
had been re-evoked (p. 115). 
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Dolores accepts Beebe’s acknowledgement of partial responsibility 
and they are able to again move forward.  
 During the fifth year of treatment, Dolores describes the 
difference between her experience with Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005) and 
with Sally, her previous therapist, who was presumably less attuned to 
the nonverbal domain:  
You accepted it, what my feelings were, or what my face was 
or offered--you met it. You felt impacted or changed by it. 
Not like Sally. With Sally it was about my unconscious 
exerting a pressure on her to feel a certain something, and 
what did that say about me. It wasn’t about “me and you,” 
the way it is here (p. 122). 
 
It seems Sally relied on verbal interpretation, and a more classical 
understanding of transference-countertransference and possibly impasse. 
 In reflecting on what went on between herself and Dolores, Beebe 
describes much that was unspoken: her self-soothing gestures--sighing, 
cradling her face, rubbing her feet together--as they met Dolores’ own 
self-soothing--her need to wear sunglasses during the transition into 
each therapy session and a very still body. Minute, implicit 
adjustments, which Beebe says she learned from working with infants, 
shade the interplay between Beebe and Dolores.  
 In identifying what was reparative for Dolores, Beebe highlights 
Dolores’ slow realization that she could impact Beebe as Beebe could 
impact her, something she had never truly felt before. Dolores 
recognizes that her pain impacts Beebe, who seeks to comfort her, which 
Dolores, in turn, experiences as comforting.  
 After ten years of therapy, Dolores still struggles. But she is 
more engaged with Beebe, better able to gaze at Beebe and be gazed at 
by Beebe. She speaks more and is more audible when she does talk. Beebe 
notes, too, that her own sense of hypervigilance while with Dolores has 
diminished, and she has returned to her more normal range of movement, 
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affect, and vocalization as Dolores’ tolerance expanded. Outside the 
consulting room, Dolores has moved deeper into relationship with her 
new boyfriend and is more connected at work and with friends. 
 
Summary 
 Looking back on his work as a young therapist, Pizer (2004), the 
relational analyst discussed in previous chapters, wistfully laments 
what may have been lost as he moved into a more mature, experienced, 
and integrated analytic self. Early on, he feels he intuitively tapped 
into, “The embodied origins of early psychological life based in 
biological and physical necessities and grounded in the enactive 
experience of holding, object presenting, affect attunement, and 
recognition that provide for procedural patterns of being, self-
regulating, and relating” (Pizer, 2004, p. 303). Pizer is, of course, 
describing just the sort of nonverbal awareness and attunement that are 
the purview of infancy studies.  
 Meanwhile, after her lengthy work with Dolores and careful 
deconstruction of the nonverbal arenas of their interaction, almost as 
a footnote, Beebe describes how much of the early, non-narrative work 
set the stage for later, explicit mourning. Dolores must come to accept 
that her good foster mother was also the abandoning mother. This split 
is eventually bridged through words and interpretation: “The nonverbal 
and implicit relatedness created the foundation of the treatment, but 
it would not have been sufficient for the treatment to flower,” writes 
Beebe (Beebe et al., 2005, p. 141).  
 As treatment and healing progressed, Beebe relays that the 
nonverbal elements of their work drifted into the background and became 
better incorporated with the verbal. What Pizer (2004) and Beebe (Beebe 
et al., 2005) are each calling attention to is the need for 
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integration: We must have access to multiple realms--the spoken 
narrative as well as nonverbal ways of knowing.  
 
 
  48 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The Case of Bee 
 
 As I now turn to my own work, I hope to show, through a clinical 
vignette, how relational theory and infancy research can be synthesized 
to reconceptualize impasse. 
 
An Introduction 
 My early experience with impasse was baffling. Only later, as I 
sat with it, read about it, and discussed it, was I able to make some 
sense of what had happened. Even still, there is no clear narrative 
arc, no tidy conclusion. Any discussion of my work with Bee is further 
complicated by the fact that we interacted in a group setting, as a 
dyad within a larger system. 
 Bee joined the Family Issues group that I co-led at a day 
treatment program midway through my first-year placement. She had been 
a patient there previously and left an impression on the staff. A white 
woman in her 40s, Bee, regardless of the weather, wore a periwinkle 
velour sweat suit with her customary iced coffee dribbled down the 
front. She had a blank, almost hollow look, her mouth slightly ajar. 
Even when Bee was focused on me, I got the sense that she was looking 
through me without quite seeing me.  
 Bee seemed to want so badly, desperately even, to be heard. She 
became intensely frustrated when she could not make herself understood; 
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yet she was often incomprehensible. She spoke in low tones, swallowing 
most of her words before they could escape her lips.  
 Bee joined the program carrying an array of diagnoses, including 
Dissociative Identity Disorder, chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
and Borderline Personality Disorder. Her past was complicated and 
difficult to piece together. I only learned snippets from Bee herself, 
and a bit more from the staff and her file. She was abused in her 
family, physically and, most likely, sexually. There was also mention 
of Bee having been part of a cult, where she may have engaged in 
coercive sexual relationships. She had a known history of alcohol 
abuse. 
 
Family Issues Group 
 Family Issues was one of the two groups that I co-led with Dave, 
another social work intern. We defined family loosely for the purposes 
of the group, so that it included the patients and the staff at our 
program. This gave us ample opportunity to talk about relationships 
within the group and the program, as well as among more traditionally 
defined family, close friends, and community.  
 The patients enjoyed challenging Dave and me in our role as 
intern leaders and would routinely question the parameters of the 
group. Two young men in particular much preferred talking about pop 
culture and sports to their family relationships. While this could be 
frustrating, for the most part their active and enthusiastic 
participation made for a group that I found deeply engaging. We had 
settled into a fairly comfortable, though somewhat unpredictable, 
rhythm when Bee joined us. 
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Impasse 
 Bee’s presence altered the group dynamic noticeably. Because of 
past relational trauma, she became upset any time she discussed family. 
It was so deeply upsetting for her that we wondered among the staff 
whether she should be in a family group at all.  
 While we encouraged patients to talk about their feelings, we 
asked them to stay away from personal details that might be traumatic 
for other patients and re-traumatizing for themselves. But Bee couldn’t 
seem to stop herself. Any disclosure flowed into spilling, leaving her 
despondent and suicidal. During her first session in the group, Bee 
described violent abuse, sharing that when she had opened up to her 
family in the past she was thrown down the stairs--a detail that was 
difficult for Bee and the other patients. As a result, much of our work 
as group leaders focused on helping Bee set limits and better titrate 
what she chose to share.  
 Rarely did Bee speak to the group about her experiences of 
dissociation, or “switching,” as she called it. At the end of session, 
however, as if to underscore how triggered and unsafe she had felt, she 
would sometimes tell me accusingly how many times she had switched 
during the group.  
 Family Issues arrived at an impasse just a few weeks after Bee 
joined us, in the run-up to the holiday season: 
Bee announced to the group: “Someone in the group is doing 
something on purpose and I'm triggered. That's why I need to go outside 
and take a pill.” 
I responded: “If you need a little time out, then go ahead. 
You'll come back though?” 
“Yes,” Bee replied, then left the room. 
Once she was gone, John, a patient, spoke up: “I don't understand 
what we did that triggered her.” 
Al, another patient, said, “I bet it's me.” 
I suggested, “Maybe we can wait until she comes back and ask 
her.”  
Al, looking visibly uncomfortable, got up to go to the bathroom. 
Following our rule about allowing only one group member to leave the 
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room at a time, I asked him, “Can you wait a minute, until Bee gets 
back?” 
Dave, the co-therapist, attempted to steer the group back to our 
earlier conversation: “It seems like some of these holidays we are 
reminded of people missing from our life. I'm just wondering, what 
kinds of things do you do to get through the holidays?” 
John, volunteered, “I watch TV, sports.” 
Al replied, “Watch TV. I always watch TV. For a year and a half 
my TV hasn't been working right.” 
I added, “Those are both good distractions. Is there anything 
else that people do?” 
At this point the group became silent.  
I asked, “So, I'm wondering how this group is feeling to 
everyone?” 
Without missing a beat, Al said, “It feels different from the way 
the group usually feels.” 
I replied, “How so?” 
Al responded: “It feels like people are on edge.” 
I said, “Yeah, I agree.” 
Bee returned to the room. 
I asked her, “Bee, are you doing okay? Can you tell us a little 
more about what was bothering you? Or do you need more time to sit with 
it?” 
Bee, sitting apart from the rest of the group, hesitated. Then, 
gesturing in the direction of Dave, the co-leader, and Al, she started 
to say, “He…” 
I interrupted, hoping she was talking about Co-leader Dave: “Are 
you talking about Dave? Or Al?” 
Bee replied: “Al. The way he's moving his leg is triggering. It 
reminds me of something else. My ex-boyfriend and the cult…” 
Al, looking stricken, jumped in: “That's not my intention. I…” 
Bee, angrily interrupted him, “What! That's your intention.” 
Dave, the co-leader, interceded: “No, he said it's not his 
intention.” 
Al explained, “I have a bad back. I have a lot of energy. I take 
medicine for my legs.” 
Bee, plaintively told the group, “I'm not feeling safe.” 
I asked her, “Do you want to sit somewhere else? Would that 
help?” 
After moving to a table apart from the group circle, Bee said, “I 
don't feel safe here. This happened in another group. Now I'm by 
myself.” 
 
 From this point on, we as a group, and particularly Dave and 
myself as group leaders, were continually returning to Bee’s safety. Al 
and his shaking leg became the focus of all of Bee’s anxiety and 
attention. She was alternately threatened and rage-filled toward them 
both.  
 In turn, I found myself worrying that I had failed in my most 
basic responsibility as group leader: to create and hold a safe space 
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for the patients. Partly because of this, I moved further into 
addressing and readdressing Bee’s fear than I might otherwise have. I 
always left space for her to bring her anxiety back into the room, 
which she did, repeatedly.  
 I also felt compelled to systematically remove whatever Bee 
identified as an external barrier to her safety. I wanted the rest of 
the group, Al and myself included, to accommodate her. So when Al 
offered to try to stop moving his leg, I agreed. I suggested once more 
that perhaps Bee could situate herself so that she would not see Al’s 
leg, thinking that she might move to the other side of the circle. Just 
as she had done the first day, Bee would remove herself from the rest 
of the group and then angrily or plaintively tell us that she felt 
separated and apart from us. Alone. My co-intern, Dave, felt that Al, 
who was also his individual patient, should not have to adjust his 
behavior. In this way, Dave and I found ourselves in a sort of parallel 
impasse. 
 
Relational Theory: Enactment 
 I see now that I was pulled into an enactment with Bee (Ginot, 
2009). By taking on the impossible task of keeping her safe in a world 
where so much--including a fellow patient moving his leg--was a 
potential trigger, I colluded (Darwin, 1999) with Bee’s fears. Rather 
than engendering safety, I confirmed and co-created a world that was 
inherently dangerous. In wanting to respect, engage, and face her 
fears, I think I ended up elevating them. In suggesting she switch 
seats, we activated what I imagine for Bee is a continual and fraught 
dance between connectedness and autonomy. I now wonder, too, what it 
meant for Bee to be in a group therapy at all, in light of her possible 
experiences with a cult. In what ways was the group dynamic a 
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repetition of that experience? Who was Al for Bee--she said he reminded 
her of an ex-boyfriend. Who were Dave and I as group leaders? 
 From a relational standpoint, it’s possible that I had to be 
pulled into an enactment in this way so that I could move a little 
closer toward understanding what Bee experienced (Bridges, 2005; 
Darwin, 1999; Davies, 1994). It has been suggested that transference 
and countertransference may be the only way that “severely traumatized 
persons can communicate their stories of distress” (Valent as cited in 
Schore, 2002, p. 470). Nor is impasse uncommon among people who have 
experienced trauma (Benjamin, 2009).  
 Sitting with Bee, I often found myself overwhelmed and fearful. I 
felt threatened by her presence in a way that I imagine the world could 
feel threatening to her. My feeling of never being sure of what to 
expect--which part of Bee I would encounter, or whether I would even be 
able to understand what she said--may all hint at the way in which she 
experiences the world. It’s a world that must feel disorganizing, 
confusing, and unpredictable to a person moving in and out of 
dissociative states. My somewhat uncharacteristic solution-oriented 
response may also have been an empathic mirroring of Bee’s need to be 
in control of her environment.  
 One of my major challenges in working with Bee was our limited 
access to a dyadic narrative and dialogue. The context of the treatment 
was a group therapy, where the conversation was collective. Though we 
did have some success discussing what the group was experiencing, Dave 
and I struggled to create the space to reflect on the impasse and our 
own experiences of it (Hoffman, 1999; Ginot, 2009). But just as Bee sat 
outside the group circle, she often seemed outside of this group 
conversation.  
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 Even when Bee sought me out during milieu time, which she 
frequently did, I struggled mightily to understand her. We carried on 
parallel conversations. There were times when we were able to connect, 
and she seemed soothed or contained by my words. She may even have felt 
understood. But just as often my lack of comprehension frustrated her. 
And I found myself frustrated by our lack of access to a spoken 
narrative. As much as I found Bee slightly terrifying, I also found her 
to be sweetly endearing. To help soothe herself, she often carried a 
stuffed animal with her. At times I’d look over and see a tiny tiger 
peeking out of her purse. And it was moving how desperately she wanted 
to connect. Because of all this, the nonverbal realm of infancy studies 
seemed like a logical place to turn, in order to try to make sense of 
what went on between the two of us.  
 
Infancy Studies: Nonverbal Communication 
 It took me a while to realize that I tended to dissociate when 
Bee was in the group, particularly following the episode with Al’s leg. 
I had an incredibly difficult time focusing. I was simultaneously aware 
of her presence and my own general sense of uneasiness as I struggled 
to really be present in the room. The feeling was somatic, which 
infancy studies suggest may be a sign of early, preverbal 
communication. At times I would feel almost nauseous and light headed.  
 One way of understanding this is that Bee was communicating 
nonverbally what she could not speak or make understood in any other 
way. Much of Bee’s communication seemed centered on the right brain, or 
right mind--what infancy researcher Schore (2002) terms “the biological 
substrate of the human unconscious” (p. 446). Whereas the left 
hemisphere manages verbal communication, an area in which Bee truly 
struggled, the right brain is responsible for other communication 
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(Schore, 2002). Infant researchers have also shown that the right 
hemisphere is where trauma and dissociative responses to trauma, as 
well as one’s sense of one’s body, are inscribed in procedural memory 
(Schore, 2002).  
 The right mind is considered the locus of empathy (Schore, 2002). 
I believe there may have been some way in which Bee and I were 
communicating right brain to right brain, my own dissociative and 
physical responses an empathic response to her dissociation. If only 
for a few moments, I got a sense of how difficult it was to exist in 
such loose and porous states as Bee did. 
 In considering Beebe’s (Beebe et al., 2005) work with Dolores, I 
also wonder what Bee might have seen in my face in these moments, what 
I was reflecting of herself back to her? How might she have experienced 
my difficulty with self-regulation and soothing? Bee herself had very 
little capacity for self-regulation. Like with the mother-infant 
interactions that Beebe and Lachmann (2002) observe, she needed the 
mutual regulation that a caregiver provides.   
 Later, I saw how organizing and containing it was for Bee to have 
her fears put in perspective. My supervisor’s approach was to reiterate 
to Bee that Day Treatment was a safe space and that she was okay and 
safe within it. During a community-wide meeting, with all Day Treatment 
patients and staff, Bee angrily interrupted to announce that a toilet 
in one of the bathroom’s had overflowed. She said this had been 
“triggering” for her. I held my breath and watched as my supervisor 
responded: Yes, this happens and it would probably happen again, in 
which case Bee should let one of the staff know so that they could take 
care of it. I was stunned to see Bee’s anger and fear go unaddressed. 
Yet her anxiety seemed to dissipate. She was markedly more organized 
when, in a sense, told that she was okay, and implicitly shown that she 
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was not destroying the group, that the group could be restored 
following disruption (Benjamin, 2009).  
 In the end, I don’t think it was the impasse dynamic that was 
problematic for Bee and the rest of Family Issues so much as how we 
managed it. As new interns, Dave and I struggled to understand and 
navigate the experience on both an explicit and implicit level. I felt 
an acute sense of having failed as a container (Benjamin, 2009). Had I 
had the theoretical scaffolding to conceptualize the impasse as more 
normative and not a failure on my part (Darwin, 1999), I think we would 
have better been able to make use of and understand the disruption that 
Al’s leg had caused.  
 Bee continued to struggle throughout her time in Day Treatment, 
and ultimately floated out of Family Issues group. She was still a 
member, but missed it as often as she came. Because of this, even the 
manifest issue of Al’s shaking leg was never fully addressed. By the 
time I left my placement, Bee was only attending the program 
intermittently.  
 
Summary 
 What ultimately helps us navigate impasse? And what is mutative? 
Is it verbal or nonverbal, articulated or felt, interpreted or lived? 
How do we accommodate ourselves to Schore’s (2002) assertion that, 
“Psychoanalysis is not ‘the talking cure,’ but more precisely ‘the 
communicating cure’ ” (p. 472)? For a person most comfortable with 
spoken forms of communication, steeped in language and narrative, as I 
know I am, this space can be uncomfortable. I found my somatic 
responses in relation to Bee especially unsettling. 
 Yet Harris (2009) writes, “Enactments may be the place where 
speech and action meet and mingle” (p. 15). I would extend this to 
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impasse. In impasse, we are given an opportunity to bridge the divide, 
loosen the boundaries, and exist on the margins between verbal and 
nonverbal ways of being.  
 Harris (2009), who works relationally, further suggests, “Slight 
shifts in experience can give rise to change and great complexity and 
difference within very short time frames” (p.6). Whereas neuroscience 
has shown that we may actually be changing people’s brains when we 
accept disruptions as they occur and willingly repair them. This is all 
impasse.  
 When taken in concert, the disclosure and dialogue of a 
relational approach and the procedural and behavioral modes elaborated 
by infancy researchers open a therapist’s awareness to all of what may 
be happening during times of impasse--the intrapsychic and 
interpersonal, relational and behavioral, and manifest and latent.  
 As for the bigger questions of how we get into impasse, what it 
means, and how we find our way through, the more important question may 
be: Where can impasse take us?  
 Rather than something profound, I have come to think of impasse 
as more humble, mundane. We move through impasse as we move through 
life, because, really, it is just another part of life. As the poet 
Mary Oliver said in “A Pretty Song,” the epigraph at the beginning this 
paper, ”From the complications of loving you/ I think there is no end 
or return. No answer, no coming out of it.” With impasse, too, there is 
no answer, no end, no return. We shouldn’t try to come out or get 
through it. Instead, we lean in and see where impasse can take us. 
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